ABSTRACT
PurposeAlthough economists and academics have studied money laundering for several decades, there continues to be gaps in the research due to a lack of reliable data on money laundering activity, and a lack of detailed sources and methods of collection in government-based reporting. The purpose of this study is to apply the Walker-Unger gravity model and examine US-based money launderer preference for the 2000-2020 time frame. This paper then compares those results with previous applications of the model and identifies trends, which may serve as the foundations of a money launderer preference theory. The results of the investigation ranked countries by preference of US-based money launderers and determined that there was consistency in country destination preference even during recessionary periods.Design/methodology/approachThe Walker–Unger gravity model as applied by Roman et al. (2021) is used to conduct the investigation, to maintain consistency in the application of the Walker–Unger model and further the objective of validating the attractiveness simulation. The model tests the predictive capability of the independent variables to establish the degree of attractiveness each country represents for the funds of US-based money launderers. A score is generated by the model, which is then used to analyze and interpret its significance in relation to all sampled countries.FindingsModel results reveal the countries with the highest attractiveness for US-based money launderers during 2000–2020 were Australia, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, Cayman Islands, Norway, Monaco, Puerto Rico, Switzerland and the USA. Model results show that over the two decades the proportion of money flow scores changed but not to a degree that would alter the country preference of US-based money launderers. US-based money launderers tended to use the same countries for their illicit financial activities, regardless of the state of the legitimate economy.Research limitations/implicationsOne of the limitations of the model is that it does not show the effect of money laundering on legitimate economic activity.Practical implicationsThe model results will give insight into the preferred destination of US-based money launderers and therefore frame one component of money laundering activities in the USA for the examined time period.Social implicationsA secondary objective of this study is to evaluate if any changes to US-based money launderer preferences occurred during the three most recent periods of economic downturn in the USA.Originality/valueThe model results will give insight into the preferred destination of US-based money launderers and therefore frame one component of money laundering activities in the USA for the examined time period. A secondary objective of this study is to evaluate if any changes to US-based money launderer preferences occurred during the three most recent periods of economic downturn in the USA. The periods chosen are the 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2007/08 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.
ABSTRACT
The Philippines started 2021 with a temporary relief as the arrival of limited COVID-19 vaccine supplies ushered in the government's launch of its national inoculation programme. However, the periodic surge of COVID-19 cases exposed the constant inadequacies of the Philippine pandemic response, straining once again the country's struggling healthcare system and obstructing the path to economic recovery. With the Filipinos still enduring the pandemic, the government became embroiled in various allegations of corruption and cronyism over the utilization of pandemic funds, which sparked public outcry. President Rodrigo Duterte responded by attacking constitutionally independent agencies that scrutinized the executive branch's alleged excesses, partiality, and incompetence. The national government's policies that further eroded the fragile Philippine democracy were also apparent in how the state agents were increasingly cracking down on the country's civic space, targeting left-leaning activists and the media. The year under review also captured the preparations and manoeuvring of the country's dominant political forces for the 2022 presidential election. Moreover, it saw fresh trajectories and dilemmas in Philippine foreign relations. China's maritime incursions tested Philippines-China relations despite the latter's generous pandemic aid. Conversely, China's increasing threat and the demand for COVID-19 vaccines prompted the Philippines to re-establish its ties with the United States. Finally, the International Criminal Court's decision to investigate Duterte's controversial drug war, albeit temporarily halted, might pave the way for a comprehensive international probe into the Philippines' deteriorating human rights situation. These key intertwining developments in the year under review would cement the legacy of Duterte's populist regime as he prepares to leave the presidency next year.
ABSTRACT
The years between 2018 and 2021 continued a pattern for Cambodia of a rolling back of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties, and saw the completion of the transition from a multi-party illiberal democracy to a one-party, authoritarian state. As attacks against political opposition increased, and political space was progressively closed, most commentators agreed that Cambodia had transitioned from competitive to authoritarian hegemony. The global COVID-19 pandemic saw a marked contraction of the economy, and its ability to recover remains to be seen. Foreign relations with the US and EU, already seriously deteriorated by 2018, continued to decline, and dependence on China increased, bringing unease to nations in the region and further afield. Recognising growing dissatisfaction among the population, the ruling party took measures to secure future control through varying means, including some efforts to address corruption, widening patronage networks, and co-opting youth groups to the party. A cabinet reshuffle brought younger blood into key political positions, and health diplomacy due to the pandemic offered means for Cambodia to smooth over tense international relations. However, at the end of 2021, the Cambodian Prime Minister remained defiant of international opinion and pressure, and looks set to continue his authoritarian, politically violent, rule.
ABSTRACT
Taiwan has achieved impressive economic growth from an agricultural state to produce the globes most advanced semiconductors. No less dynamic and exciting are the political developments on the island. Once a colony under the Dutch, Chinese and Japanese flags, the island has become quasi-autonomous. The abolition of martial law and the transformation into one of the world's most democratic nations are impressive. High education levels, an exceptionally well handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and a non-corrupt government pushing future technology and supporting Taiwan's democratic path make Taiwan an attractive investment target. One look at the facts is enough to see that the Taiwanese are happy with their current system and enjoy great space. One country and two systems are not a good solution for Taiwan politically and economically. In principle, Taiwan has only one option: keep the status quo, minimize provocations against China, and hope for a diplomatic and acceptable outcome to the situation. At the same time, the government must promote itself in the free world and conclude free trade and other mutual exchange agreements.
ABSTRACT
Political corruption affects each nation-state differently, but the outcomes are nominally the same: a deficit of public trust, weakened government institutions and undermined political systems. This article analyzes issues of political corruption in Australia by framing them within a national integrity ecosystem (NIE) and addressing them against the proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission (CIC) 2020 bill. It also discusses prevalent ‘grey’ areas of Australian politically-corrupt behavior where they interact with the private sector: the revolving door, political donations, and lobbying;and the state of Australia’s implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. This article argues for their inclusion within the mandated scope of the proposed CIC. There is a need for strong legislation, both domestic and international, to fight corruption. This article then discusses the application of the provisions of the draft Anticorruption Protocol to the UN Convention Against Corruption (APUNCAC) that may apply with respect to these ‘grey’ issues, and how an International Anti-Corruption Court may provide another institutional model for Australia to follow. Finally, this article links these proposals to the 2021 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Corruption and the 9th Conference of States Parties on the UNCAC (COSP9). These events illustrate multilateral momentum and progress on anti-corruption. As a country that has historically supported the UN multilateral framework and its institutions, this article recommends a proactive approach for Australia so that the passing of a strong domestic anticorruption initiative will contribute to the adoption, and eventual ratification, of the APUNCAC.